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Daniel Carlton
TRACKING: THE END OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Brenna B. Mahoney*
INTRODUCTION
Tracking is the process used by schools to categorically divide and assign students to
differentiated courses of study.1 It is often espoused by educators as being the best way to
teach large student bodies comprised of many students with diverse learning abilities.2
Some students are placed according to "what seems most appropriate to their future lives,"
and often an entire curriculum is decided on the basis of the initial classification.3
Although school administrators' intent behind the use of tracking is, in most cases, to
advance the best interest of the students, there is much evidence to suggest that the practical
effect of tracking is not beneficial but rather detrimental to students, particularly those in
the lower tracks.
This paper will first examine the historical development of tracking in American
schools. Of particular importance here are the traditional legal challenges to tracking, which
in large part utilize the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
desegregation mandates of Brown v. Board of Education.4 The following sections will
describe the discriminatory and detrimental effects of tracking and examine several legal,
legislative and state-based strategies available to challenge tracking. In light of the
progression of challenges to tracking, I offer the proposition that if--as history will support--
education were considered a fundamental right, tracking would fail constitutional scrutiny
and would necessarily be abolished.
I. THE HISTORY OF TRACKING IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
Through the nineteenth century, most schools followed the "common school" theory.
The schools, designed to provide a common educational experience, offered a curriculum
shared by all students, "respect[ing] neither class nor caste."5 The schools were designed
to build a successful, cohesive nation by "increas[ing] opportunity, teach[ing] morality and
citizenship, encourag[ing] leadership, maintain[ing] social mobility, and promot[ing]
J.D. candidate at New York Law School. Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Human Rights. She is also
a certified elementary school teacher. This paper is dedicated to the students of the Lincoln School in New
Brunswick, New Jersey. The author thanks tham. all for the inspiration they continue to provide
1 j. OAKES, KEEPING TRACK: How SCHOOLS STRUCrURE INEQUALrrY, 2-3 (1985); INEQUALrTY IN
EDUCATION #12, July 1972, at 28.
2 Nealson, Educators Question Benefits ofAcademic Tracking, Boston Globe, Sept. 23,1990, (South Weekly),
at 1 (city ed.).
J . OAKES, supra note 1, at 3.
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 OAKES, supra note 1, at 3.
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responsiveness to social progress. '
The "common school" prevailed until the late nineteenth century, attended almost
entirely by white middle-class children. Late in the nineteenth century, however, the United
States was faced with an influx of Eastern and Southern European immigrants, who spoke
no English and whose children often had little or no previous schooling. Schools created
special programs to assist these students in overcoming initial difficulties and to prepare
them for regular schoolwork. These "opportunity classes" were the first widespread use of
specialized assistance in American schools. A more complex society required a
"differentiation of skills that a common education simply couldn't provide."7 As the number
of public schools and the number of children attending school grew rapidly, schools were
called upon to provide different types of education.8 Accordingly, different curricula were
developed for students with different abilities in order to prepare them for their particular
life work.'
During this period, ideas about "Social Darwinism" provided one rationale for
treating some groups as less fit than others with regard to their social and moral
development. This theory (often popularized as the eugenics movement) argued that ethnic
minorities and the poor were responsible for their own ghetto-like living conditions because
they were biologically deficient and unable to make better lives for themselves."
Psychologist G. Stanley Hall" applied Social Darwinism to education. Hall believed that
the development of the individual follows the same set of stages as that of the entire race
in its evolution from presavagery to civilization and that different environments, such as
rural contrasted with urban, could have profound effects on the progression of children
through these stages. The school's job "Was to study the needs of various children and
design curricula around the differences among them.' 12 Based on this theory, students
were classified according to their ethnic, racial, and economic backgrounds. By the end of
World War I, however, society began to question the pedagogical soundness of these
classifications due to their apparent conflict with the "American rhetoric of an open and
6 Id. at 16.
7 Kirp, Schools as Sorters: The Constitutional and Policy Implications of Student Classification, 121 U. PA.
L. REv. 705, 714 (1973) [hereinafter Sorters].
8 For example, "[c]olleges and universities wanted a more standardized precollegiate education. Many of
the middle class called for free public education available to all youth. Poor and immigrant families were eager
for the economic benefits they believed schooling would provide their children. Businessmen were interested
in acquiring a more productive and literate work force. Organized labor was concerned about who should
control the training of workers. Progressive reformers sought humane solutions to the immense social problems
confronting the burgeoning population of poor and immigrant youth.... The public high school, already
strupgling, was seen as a means to all these ends." J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 20.
This was not the first time that this approach to education was espoused. In the eighteenth century Jean-
Jacques Rousseau wrote, "In the social order where all positions are determined, each man ought to be raised
for his .... Education is useful only insofar as fortune is in agreement with the parents' vocation." JJ.
RoussEAu, EMILE OR ON EDUCATION 41 (1979).
10 OAKES, supra note 1, at 21.
11 (1844-1924), Ph.D. Harvard, 1878.
12 OAKES, supra note 1, at 23.
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classless society."'13
The development of standardized testing contributed to the implementation of ability
grouping. The first intelligence test was designed by Alfred Binet in France in 1904. Binet's
purpose was to identify those children whose poor performance demonstrated a need for
special education. These tests often indicated that white Anglo-Saxons were more intelligent
by nature. The experts did not consider that differences between racial or ethnic groups
might be the result of environmental factors or cultural bias in the tests. The classification
and separation of students based on testing was increased dramatically throughout the 1910's
and 1920's.' 4 "Since students were thought to have different innate abilities and to be
destined for different levels in the social hierarchy, tracking supposedly assured each student
an equal opportunity to reach his or her own innate potential."15 In 1918 the National
Education Association (NEA) stated that "[e]ducation in a democracy... should develop
in each individual the knowledge, interests, ideals, habits, and powers whereby he will find
his place and use that place to shape himself and society toward ever nobler ends."'
6
The 1950's pulled education into the Cold War with the Soviet Union as the country
reacted to the Soviets' development of Sputnik, the first earth satellite. 7 This Soviet
development challenged the long-standing belief that America retained technological
supremacy. Many cast the blame on public education. The federal government responded
by launching a campaign to reform education, which was considered to have "gone soft."
In 1958, tracking was promulgated by the government, through the National Defense
Education Act, to implement curriculum reform projects in mathematics and the sciences.
Through the 1960's and 1970's, tracking practices were employed as a way to circumvent
court-mandated desegregation orders in the South. 8 Such blatant attempts to reject Brown
v. Board of Education failed, as the federal courts recognized the unconstitutional
motives.' 9
Tracking systems have continued to be employed in most high schools in the United
States.' ° Today's tracking is beginning at earlier levels of schooling than it has in the past.
" Id. at 36.
14 Note, Teaching Inequality: The Problem of Public School Tracking, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1318, 1322 (1989).
15 Id. at 1322-1323; J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 35.
16 j. OAKES, supra note 1, at 35, n.40 (citing J. SPRING, EDUCATION AND THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE
STATE Il (1972)).
17 D. ARMSTRONG, K. HENSON & T. SAVAGE, EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION 39-40 (1986); Hearings
before the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity of the United States Senate, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
on Equal Educational Opportunity 10203 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings] (see especially the statement of Dr. Mark
R. Lohman).
18 Teaching Inequality, supra note 14, at 1323. See, e.g., United States v. Tunica County School District, 421
F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970); Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 330 F.
Supp 1340, 1342 (E.D. La. 1971), affd 456 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1972), cet. denied, 409 U.S. 1013 (1972).
29 See infra, Section IV for discussion of traditional legal challenges to tracking.
20 Most studies indicate that 90% of high school students are tracked. Teaching Inequality, supra note 14,
at 1321; Warren, Ability Grouping Comes Under Fire, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1988, at B8, col. 3.
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Some schools group according to ability as early as kindergarten or first grade.21 The
groups are usually arranged for instruction in each subject, but as children progress through
elementary school and into middle school or junior high they are separated into different
classes based on standardized test scores, performance, and teacher recommendations.'
The prevalence of tracking indicates the importance which educators often attach to
it. Supporters of tracking systems say they "provide mechanisms for differentiating among
students; ... offer reward and sanctions for school performance; ... ease the tasks of
teachers and administrators by restricting somewhat the range of ability among students in
a given classroom; ... and purportedly improve student achievement."' 2  Although
defenders acknowledge some of the problems of tracking systems, most maintain that they
allow teachers to "address the particular needs of students who have widely diverse aptitudes
and levels of achievement."'
According to David Kirp, the first two asserted purposes are infrequently asserted by
school officials.25 However, the school administrators' argument that tracking is beneficial
because it eases the tasks of teachers and administrators is relied on heavily and is
undeniably persuasive. Evaluation and placement of students may be accomplished with a
single test. Homogeneous classrooms require less preparation by the teacher as they allow
the teacher to plan merely one lesson for the entire group since the tracking system
presumes the students in one group are all at the same ability level. But the corollary that
easing the task of teachers improves education and promotes higher achievement is
arguable. As will be discussed in Section III, there is little evidence that ability grouping
does in fact improve achievement.26
II. THE DISCRIMINATORY AND DETRIMENTAL
EFFECTS OF TRACKING
The process of tracking is inherently discriminatory. Placement into tracks
accomplished through standardized testing results in the overrepresentation of minorities
and poor students grouped into the lower ability tracks.27 Once placed in the lower tracks,
these students remain in the lower tracks, due in large part to differential treatment based
on this initial placement. These psychological and sociological effects limit the students'
education and employment prospects.
21Nealson, supra note 2, at 1; Welsh, Fast-Track Trap: How Mbility Grouping' Hurts Our Schools,
Washington Post, at B1, (final ed.) (1988).
22 W. FINDLEY AND M. BRYAN, PROS AND CONS OF ABILITY GROUPING (1975); Warren, supra note 20;
J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 9.
23 Sorters, supra note 7, at 716.
24 Warren, supra note 20.
25 Sorters, supra note 7, at 716.
26 J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 7; Sorters, supra note 7, at 716; Teaching Inequality, supra note 14, at 1330-31.
27 Hearings, supra note 17, at 10200; Cohen, infra note 32, at 20.
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The structure of a tracking system is comprised of many characteristics which
collectively discriminate against students. Most track assignments are determined by
standardized test scores?2 Although standardized tests provide a useful device for sorting,
the tests guarantee that half the students will score below average. "The differences in
actual (not measured) reading achievement, then, may be relatively small. 29  Further
criticism relates to the fact that the national tests do not necessarily reflect the reading
curriculum of particular schools.
Many critics of testing claim that white middle class children are "most likely to do
well.., because of the compatibility of their language and experiences with the language
and content of the test questions, with the group against which the tests were normed, with
testing procedures, and with most of the adults doing the testing."' 0 These criticisms are
usually encompassed in the general proposition that standardized tests are culturally biased.
However, proponents of testing argue that the tests do give a fair representation of ability
to function within middle class school culture and are, therefore, valid predictors of
academic performance. Others argue that the tests are merely reflective of a society where
some people are subject to disadvantages.3 The unresolved nature of the controversy, in
conjunction with the lower scores (and subsequent low placement) of minorities supports
the argument against using standardized tests as the basis for grouping students.
The content of courses at different track levels is typically very different. Where high
track students are studying classic and modem works of literature, low track students are
being taught reading and literacy skills, such as filling out forms and job applications.32
Although students with lower reading ability do need such skills, they are being denied the
exposure to higher learning and critical thinking.33
Additionally, there is little evidence that achievement gains are made by students who
are tracked as opposed to those placed in heterogeneous classes.3 There are a small
number of studies that suggest that ability grouping has little positive or negative effect on
the achievement of low track students, but even these studies generally concede that
28 The Findley and Bryan survey in 1970, supra note 22, revealed that 83% of districts surveyed used
achievement and/or IQ tests as the basis for classification.
29 J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 10.
30 Id. at 11.
31 A. WOOLFOLK & N. MCCUNE-NICOLICH, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR TEACHERS 535 (1984).
32 Cohen, Minority Pupils Get More Slow-Tracking, Boston Globe, Sept. 20, 1990, (Metro/Region), at 20;
Warren, supra note 20; Hearings, supra note 17, at 10229-35.
33 There are methods which teachers could employ in order to expose low track students to the great literary
works of our history. For example, teachers can read aloud to their classes; they can employ improvisation
techniques to study the works of Shakespeare; and they can utilize the rich libraries of videotapes now available
to show the classics to their students. See infra, Section V, for discussion of alternatives to tracking.
34 Nealson, supra note 2. "There is little evidence to support the time-honored contention that segregating
students by ability improves academic achievement." (citing Massachusetts State Department of Education report,
Structuring Schools for Students Success: A Focus on Ability Grouping); Warren, supra note 20; FINDLEY AND
BRYAN, supra note 22, at 352.
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beneficial effects are found only in high ability students who are grouped homogeneously. 35
Teachers play an enormous role in the shaping of students' experiences in school.
Teachers' expectations of students' abilities and performance have been found to have the
effect of a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, when a teacher expects a class of students to
have high abilities, [s]he treats the students in certain ways based on that expectation. The
students respond in ways that complement the teacher's expectation. For example, teachers
tend to ask more questions of students who are more likely to respond correctly.' A
teachers' expectations regarding a student's capabilities can be based on any number of
factors, including her/his own class, race, ethnic, and/or gender biases, in addition to her/his
beliefs about the students' abilities based on their placement.37 In addition to teachers
expecting less from low track students, it has also been found that teachers prefer to teach
higher track classes.' High tracked students tend to have:
more time set aside for learning by teachers, more actual class time observed
to be taken up with learning activity, more time expected to be spent on
homework, fewer students observed off-task, students' perceptions of learning
as the thing they do most in class, and more of the kind of instructional
practice that is likely to motivate students to learn and decrease the time
needed to do so... [L]ow-track students' opportunities were more restricted
in all these ways.39
The students who receive limited opportunities are in many cases those who are already
disadvantaged by "cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds [that] require the best
instructional quality to help bridge the gaps between school and home in language, behavior
patterns, and attitudes - certainly one very important aspect of motivation."4°
Reinforcement of social stereotypes and low self-concept is another significant
detriment to the students in the low tracks. As schools sort their students, they socialize
them, directing students' attitudes toward "institutional structures, toward themselves, and
toward their anticipated roles in adult society."' Low track students expect to attain less
than high track students. The actual limited achievement in conjunction with the impact on
the affective domain on a student' self-concept is a violation of the mandate of Brown v.
Board of Education and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
35 A. WOOLFOLK, supra note 31, at 457 (citing Kulik & Kulik, Effects of Ability Grouping on Secondary
School Students: A Motor-analysis of Evaluation Findings, 34 AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH JOURNAL
302, 307-318 (1982)).
36 A. WOOLFOLK, supra note 31, at 293 (citing ROSENTHAL & JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM:
TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT (1968)).
37 'The research literature is filled with reports about teacher bias against lower class children in general
and against minority children, almost regardless of their social class origins." Hearings, supra note 17, at 10221.
38 Hearings, supra note 17, at 10222; FINDLEY AND BRYAN, supra note 22, at 352-53.
39 J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 111.
40 Id.
41 1 d at 119.
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Amendment. Chief Justice Warren stated in Brown, "To separate [children] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.4 2 Although a narrow reading of the opinion says it referred only to
deliberate separation of the races, much of the opinion turned on the social impact of
segregation and the importance of education.43 It seems obvious that separation based on
supposed intellectual [in]ability could only produce the same result as separation based on
race and is as offensive to national policy against segregation.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES To TRACKING
A. Direct Challenges
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, litigation specifically challenging tracking began.
The most well known case is Hobson v. Hansen.44 In Hobson, the District of Columbia had
implemented a tracking system after being ordered to desegregate its schools. The court
determined that the classification was performed on the basis of students' scores on tests
which were culturally biased in favor of white middle-class students a5 Judge Skelly Wright
analyzed the purposes and administration of the tracking system and held that the system
in the District of Columbia violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4  Judge Wright applied the mere rationality test4 , requiring that the
classification of students be reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of the
governmental activity and is rationally carried out.a Although this is the easiest standard
for a governmental action to meet, Judge Wright found that this particular track system was
a discriminatory classification system. Minority and poor students were effectively
segregated from white and more affluent students by the tracking plan. Black students had
been denied admission to special programs which were prerequisites for placement in higher
tracks. Judge Wright opined that "students['] ... educational opportunities are being limited
on the erroneous assumption that they are capable of accepting no more."49 Other features
also caused the tracking to fail the rationality test: the impermissible standardized tests, the
separation of students into rigid curricula, entailing both physical segregation and a disparity
42 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
43 Id. at 494, n.11.
44 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub. nom Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (en banc).
45 Id. at 406, 473-492.
46 Id. at 513-14.
47 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (application of the rationality test
in an equal protection claim).
48 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. at 511.
49 Id. at 514.
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of educational opportunity; and inferior opportunities for those in the lower tracks.5 °
Although the holding of Hobson is usually interpreted as being rather narrow, Justice
Wright did state that "any system of ability grouping which, through failure to include and
implement the concept of compensatory education for the disadvantaged child or otherwise
fails to bring the majority of children into the mainstream of public education denies the
children excluded equal educational opportunity and thus encounters the constitutional
bar."51
The Hobson decision was affirmed on appeal but the holding specifically limited the
abolition of the track system to the specific plan used in the District of Columbia.52 The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged the school board's discretion in fashioning
school policy as long as it is within the bounds of Constitutional law.53
After Hobson, litigation ensued in the southern states as school districts attempted
to evade desegregation orders.5 Often newly desegregated schools used tracking plans
that were found to have a racially disparate impact. The federal courts usually struck down
the tracking, but most of the decisions held that schools may not use ability grouping to
bypass desegregation orders. None of the cases held that racially disparate tracking was a
per se violation of the Equal Protection Clause.55
The Fifth Circuit was particularly consistent in its application of this doctrine. In
Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School District,56 the court held that testing could not
be used to group students until a unitary school system had been established. In United
States v. Tunica County School District, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
decision which approved classification and placement of students by achievement scores.
57
Similarly, in Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board,8 the court held that regardless of the
validity of the testing of students, "it could not be used until a school district had been
established as a unitary system.'6 9 The court went on to specify that the particular district
in question "must have operated for several years as a unitary system" before implementing
testing as the basis for ability grouping.6°
50 Id. at 513. Judge Wright also questioned the intent of the school administrators, since even they conceded
that the tracking system was placed into effect in response to desegregation orders, but this inquiry was
inconclusive. The Court did find, however, that intent to segregate played a part in at least one or more of the
stages of teacher assignment.
5 Id. at 515.
52 Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 189-90 (1969).
53 Id.
54 Teaching Inequality, supra note 14, at 1324.
55 Id. at 1325.
56 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated in part and reversed in part sub nom., Carter v. West Feliciana
Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 226 (1969).
57 421 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
51 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1971).
5' Id. at 1401.
60 Id.
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Four years after Lemon, the court in McNeal v. Tate County School District held that
the use of racially disparate tracking systems in previously segregated school systems was
invalid unless the district could demonstrate that its "assignment method [was] not based on
the present results of past segregation or [that it would] remedy such results through better
educational opportunities.
61
Without an immediate history of de jure segregation, the modem application of this
doctrine protects tracking programs. In 1985 the Eleventh Circuit held that a tracking
system that placed blacks disproportionately in the low tracks satisfied the McNeal test
because the black students had never attended a dual school system.62 More recently, a
federal district court in Mississippi also held that the tracking system was valid because
socio-economic factors were a sufficient explanation for the disparate racial impact.63 The
most recent case, Quarles v. Oxford Municipal Separate School District, also upheld tracking
that had a racially disparate impact because the court found that the tracking system was
without "any racially biased taint."6
These current cases reflect the recent conservative trend in the courts and the
tendency to view state action as independent from past racial discrimination, as recognized
by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio: "One wonders
whether the [Court] still believes that race discrimination - - or, more accurately race
discrimination against nonwhites - - is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it
ever was."65
B. Establishment of Education as a Fundamental Right
Although the United States Constitution does not expressly provide for public
education, there is legal support for establishing education as a fundamental right, thereby
affording it the utmost constitutional protection.66 This view has yet to be adopted by the
Supreme Court67, however, given the growing disparity of the quality of education between
61 McNeal v. Tate County School District, 508 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1975).
62 NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1413-15 (11th Cir. 1985).
63 Montgomery v. Starkville Municipal Separate School District, 665 F. Supp. 487 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
64 868 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1989), reh'g denied, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 7099. Quarles was actually a nearly
twenty year old suit, challenging desegregation measures. See prior history, Quarles v. Oxford Municipal
Separate School Dist. (N.D. Miss. 1972), 366 F.Supp. 247, affd, 487 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied 489
F.2d 1312 (5th Cir. 1974).
65 109 S.Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66 Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public School: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV.
777, 812 (1985).
67 The Supreme Court held that education is not a fundamental right in San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). However, the Court did concede that education is of "undisputed importance"
and is closely tied to the exercise of the right to vote and the First Amendment freedoms of expression. The
Court even suggested that "some identifiable quantum of education [may be] a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of [the right to vote and freedoms of expression.]" San Antonio, 411 U.S.
at 35-36.
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the rich and poor of this nation and the increasing controversy about tracking, the issue
deserves attention.
Courts have held that in order to be recognized as a fundamental right, the right at
issue must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.' The Court has
employed a variety of semantic tests to determine whether a contested right is
fundamental. 69 Early cases asked whether the right asked to be recognized was "implicit
in our concept of ordered liberty" or "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be fundamental."70 A later case asked whether the right was "fundamental
to the American scheme of justice. '7l
The Court has found fundamental right status within the term "liberty" in the Due
Process Clause. Selection of these rights is typically based on the Court's decision to
enforce natural law rights.72 The Court's ratio decidendi may differ from case to case,
relying on a penumbra theory of guarantees, 73 a Ninth Amendment argument, 74 or an
express natural law approach,7' but the result is the same: that the state may not infringe
upon a fundamental right except to achieve a compelling governmental interest via necessary
means.76 The modem Court also awards such status of fundamentality to the right to
privacy or personal autonomy, in matters usually limited to those involving marriage, child
bearing, and child rearing.77
Education is one of those rights so critical that it warrants the nomenclature and
standard of review of a fundamental right.78 The history and legislation regarding
education in this country indicate how education has been "so rooted in the traditions and
68 San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 33-34. The Court has examined fundamental rights in two related contexts: the
incorporation controversy and substantive due process. The incorporation controversy is the debate over which
rights from the Bill of Rights should be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Substantive
due process analysis determines which rights are to be encompassed by the term "liberty" in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also, Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See generally Ratner, supra note 66, at 823, n.181; Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
69 Sorters, supra note 7.
70 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
71 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-9 (1968).72 The natural law concept was first espoused by Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
Chase believed that natural law, as well as the specific provisions of the written Constitution, restricted and
regulated government power.
73 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (majority opinion by Justice Douglas found a
fundamental right to privacy in the penumbras of several explicit guarantees of the Bill of Rights).
74 Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (espoused the belief that the Ninth Amendment recognized that
other rights of equal importance to those explicitly guaranteed, were to be protected against government action).
75 Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring) (defended the judicial function of selecting values that had a historical
andyhilosophical right to be fundamental).
6 Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interest: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U.L. REV. 917, 968 (1988).
77 Gottlieb, id. at 928-29; Ratner, supra note 66, at 823; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. 479; Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (state action prohibiting abortion violates the Fourteenth Amendment).78 Sorters, supra note 7, at 739-40.
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conscience of our people as to be fundamental. 79 Case law also demonstrates a strong
history of commitment to education and evidences that a high degree of personal autonomy
is embraced by our citizens with regard to the education of their children.'
C. Education and the Intent of the Framers.
The early stages of education in this country limited schooling to white, middle-class
and upper-class males.8 ' But as early as the framing of the Constitution, ideas about the
necessity of education were well formed. 2  Thomas Jefferson regarded education as
"necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political
system if we are to preserve freedom and independence."' 8  The writings of Jefferson
reflect his commitment to education. On one occasion he wrote to his friend George
Wythe, "Preach, my dear Sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish and improve the law for
educating the common people."84 Another of his writings states:
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it away
from them, but to inform their discretion by education.
85
Others of our nation's founders expressed that a commitment to education would safeguard
the new republic.86 In George Washington's farewell address, he stated that "public
opinion should be enlightened" in order to lend import to the voices to which government
must respond.87 Throughout the nineteenth century, education was considered vital to the
maintenance of our political system. This message was clear in a plea for federal support
of schools by John D. Pierce, Michigan's first state superintendent of public instruction:
However unpretending and simple in form, our government is nonetheless
effective and perfect. It proceeds from the people-is supported by the people-
and depends upon the people-and at the same time restrains and controls the
people more effectually than the most rigid systems of despotism. But how
is this political fabric to be preserved? Only by the general diffusion of
79 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
80 Sorters, supra note 7, at 739.
81 J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 16.
82 D. TYACK, T. JAMES, & A. BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 1785-1954, at
15 (1987). "The political ideology underlying the common school was consistent... - that public education was
necessary to sustain republican institutions...."
83 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
84 D. TYACK, supra note 82, at 23, n.7.
85 Id.
86 id.
87 id.
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knowledge. Children of every name and age must be taught the qualifications
and duties of American citizens, and learn in early life the art of self-control-
they must educated. And to accomplish this object, our chief dependence
must necessarily be the free school system.88
These examples evidence that this nation was founded on the belief that education
is necessary to our system of government in order for the people to exercise their
enumerated rights and to maintain a cohesive republic.89 In other words, education is
implicit in our Constitution and for that reason should be deemed a fundamental right.9
D. Case Law
The holding of Brown v. Board of Education relied heavily on the significant role
which education plays in our society.91 In his opinion for the unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Warren wrote that
[tjoday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditure
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him[/her] for later
professional training, and in helping him[/her] to adjust normally to his[/her]
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if [s]he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be available to all on equal terms.92
88 Id. at 14-15, n.5. Educational theorists such as Noah Webster and Benjamin Rush also argued the
necessity of education to our form of government.
89 Id at 15.
90 Sorters, supra note 7, at 739.
91 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown explicitly overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). Chief Justice Warren quoted the Kansas case from the court below, "segregation of white
and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater
when it has the sanction of law;, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the Negro people. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with
the sanciton of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system."
Segregated (dual) school systems were standard educational practice until the proscription of Brown. See,
for example, Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 362 (1874).
92 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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Although Chief Justice Warren was careful to couch his decree in language that did
not expressly provide a right to education, he did assert that once a state has elected to
provide education, it is a right that must be available to all on equal terms.' Also, and
perhaps more significantly, Justice Warren harkened back to the writings of the framers,
concerning the necessity of education in order to perform the functions of good citizenry.94
It is this necessity that transforms education from a privilege to a fundamental right.9'
Language in other decisions has also supported the proposition that education should
be one of the primary goals of government. For instance, in Meyer v. Nebraska,96 the
Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he American people have always regarded education and
acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance, which should be diligently
promoted."97 In 1982, the Supreme Court held that the state's exclusion of children who
were illegal aliens from public school was an equal protection violation.' The state's
interest in excluding illegal aliens was insufficient to deprive the children from as personally
and socially an important public service as education.99
Despite the Court's treatment of education as a fundamental right, the Court has
declined to explicitly grant education such status. 1°° In San Antonio Indep. School District
v. Rodriguez,1°1 a 5-4 decision, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, explained that not
every socially important interest is a right under the Constitution. The Court concluded that
"Education is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under the Federal
Constituion."'0 2 Writing for the four dissenting Justices, Justice Marshall relied heavily on
the argument that education is necessary to exercise other enumerated rights (such as the
right to vote). °3 While the majority, Justices Powell, Burger, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Stewart, held there to be no fundamental right of education, Justice Marshall wrote,
[o]f particular importance is the relationship between education and the
political process.... Education serves the essential function of instilling in
our young an understanding and appreciation for the principles and operation
of our governmental processes. Education may instill the interest and provide
93 Id. at 483 (emphasis added). See infra notes 124-141 and accompanying text for discussion of the states'
educational provisions and their obligation to provide equal educational opportunity.
94 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (citing writings of Thomas
Jefferson).
95 San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-104, 110-117 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that a criminal statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages was
unconstitutional).
97 Id. at 400.
98 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), reh. denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982).
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 35 (5-4 decision) ("Education is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under Federal Constitution.").
1o1 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
102 Id. at 35.
103 Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the tools necessary for political discourse and debate. Indeed, it has
frequently been suggested that education is the dominant factor affecting
political consciousness and participation.... But the most immediate and
direct concern must be the demonstrated effect of education on the exercise
of the franchise by the electorate .... Data ... clearly demonstrate[s] a
direct relationship between participation in the electoral process and level of
educational attainment.... It is this sort of intimate relationship between a
particular personal interest and specific constitutional guarantees that has
heretofore caused the Court to attach special significance, for purposes of
equal protection analysis, to individual interests."
Here, Justice Marshall adroitly extracted the nexus between rights which are
fundamental because they are vital to our system of government and those rights that are
necessary to personal autonomy. In the area of education the two are inextricably
intertwined, calling for even greater reverence to the education of the citizenry.
Another line of Supreme Court cases further reveals the ways in which educational
choices are linked with personal autonomy and therefore are so important that government
regulation of those choices is limited."5 Pierce v. Society of Sisters'06 involved a challenge
to an Oregon statute virtually requiring children to attend public school.'07 The Supreme
Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional because it unreasonably interfered with
the liberty of parents to direct their children's education.'08 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"0 9 the
Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented a state from compelling
the children of respondents, Amish citizens, to attend formal high school until the age of
sixteen." 0 The Court acknowledged the State's interest in assuring that its citizens are
educated, in order to prepare them to participate in the political process and to be self-
reliant and self-sufficient members of society."' Although the holding of this case was in
favor of the Amish, allowing them to cease formal schooling earlier than permitted by
statute, the opinion incorporates the general principle that individuals need the liberty to
104 Id. at 113 (footnotes omitted).
105 See generally T. VAN GEEL, THE COURTS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION LAW (1987).
106 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
107 id.
108 Id. at 533-34.
'09 406 U.S. 205 (1972).110 I. at 234.
111 Id. at 224-25. The State relied on Thomas Jefferson's theory, discussed earlier, supra notes 81-84 and
accompanying text. However, the Court found that this interest cannot interfere with the individual's right of
self-direction because the Amish way of life had already instilled a strong work ethic and self-reliance. The
decision in Yoder also relied on the fact that the Amish's claim was an infringement of their freedom of religion.
This may have given more weight to the interest of the Amish in the balance between state and individual
interest; however, it is obvious from the opinion that the Court viewed the Amish as having already attained the
goals of formal schooling, perhaps more effectively than the schools themselves.
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guide their own education or that of their children in order to reach meaningful
participation in society." 2 Attaining that goal necessitates the equal opportunity of
education for all citizens, so that the exercise of other constitutional guarantees, such as
voting and expression, is available to all. 3
The escalation of education to the status of a fundamental right is necessary to carry
out any effective educational policy. Because of recent changes regarding the necessity of
discriminatory intent in discrimination cases," 4 it is now virtually impossible for plaintiffs
to prevail in discrimination cases based only on disparate impact. 5 With fundamental
right status, strict scrutiny would be applied to tracking programs that abridged an
individual's access to her right to education, regardless of any developments in the typical
disparate impact cases." 6
E. Federal Legislative Challenges
Although the Court did come close to establishing education as a fundamental right
nearly twenty years ago, the current conservative swing of the Court suggests that
reconsideration of the issue is not likely. However, as an alternative to the development of
a federal constitutional standard, plaintiffs may find remedy in legislative or state-based
challenges.
Congressional legislation indicates the commitment of the federal government to
equal and adequate education for its citizens and may provide avenues in which to challenge
tracking. In 1974, Congress enacted the Equal Educational Opportunities Act." 7 This Act
illustrates the commitment on the part of the federal government to insure that all children
receive an equal education, regardless of their race, color, sex, or national origin. The
stated purpose of the EEOA is to "specify appropriate remedies for the orderly removal of
the vestiges of the dual school system.""8 It seems that perpetuation of the type of
disparity caused by tracking is the very result Congress wished to avoid by enacting the
Equal Opportunity Act. Although Congress did not specifically prohibit the denial of
opportunity based on perceived or actual ability, it is reasonable to propose that such a
denial contravenes congressional intent.
Other examples of legislation characterizing the importance of education are the
Education of the Handicapped Act," 9 the Adult Education Act, 2° the American
112 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-25.
113 San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
114 Strossen, Introduction, 6 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 1 (1990).
115 The court has severely limited the possibility of plaintiff success in disparate impact cases by shifting the
burden of proof. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing C. v. Antonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct.
2180 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2364 (1989).
11 Sorters, supra note 7, at 739.
117 Pub. L. 93-380, title II, § 202, 88 Stat. 514 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758)[hereinafter "the EEOA"].
118 20 U.S.C. § 1701(b).
119 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485.
120 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213(d).
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Printing House for the Blind Amendments,' the National Reading Improvement
Program,'2 and the Education of the Deaf Act.123 The purposes of these statutes reflect
an assurance that various groups receive the type of education that is necessary. These are
only a few examples of the volumes of legislation enacted by Congress with regard to
education, yet they exemplify the significant role that education plays in our system of
government.
F. State-Based Challenges
Most states have included explicit protection for public education in their
constitutions. 124 State case law has strongly suggested that within state constitutional
provisions and state equal protection clauses, education is considered a fundamental
right."2 State courts have, therefore, construed their constitutional provisions to require,
at a minimum, that states provide an adequate education in basic skills. 26  The West
Virginia Supreme Court went beyond the basics in Pauley v. Kelly,127 holding that the state
constitution required schools to go beyond effectively educating in basic skills. 28  The
court stated that, "[schools should] develop ... the minds, bodies, and social morality of its
charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and
121 20 U.S.C. §§ 101-106.
122 20 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1981.
123 20 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4362.
124 See ALASKA CONSr. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONSF. art. XI, § 1; ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; CAL. CONSr.
art. IX, § 1; COLO. CONSr. art. IX, § 2; CONN. CONSr. art. VIII, § 1; DEL. CONSr. art. X, § 1; FLA. CONST. art.
IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. X,
§ 1; IND. CONSr. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONSr. art. 9 2d, § 2; KAN. CONSr. art. VI, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; LA.
CONsr. art. VIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. 8, § 1; MD. CONSr. art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONSr. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; MICH.
CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; Mo. CONST. art. 9, § 1(a); MONT. CONSr. art. X, § 1; NEB.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; N.H. CoNsT. pt. 2, art. 83; NJ. CONSr. art. VIII, § 4; N.M.
CONSr. art XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONSr. art. IX, § 2; N.D. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO
CONSr. art. VI, § 3; OKLA. CONSr. art. XIII, § 1; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; R.I.
CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.C. CONSr. art. XI, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; TEX.
CONsr. art. VII, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 68; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH.
CONSr. art. IX, § 1; W.VA. CONSr. art. XII, § 1; Wis. CoNsr. art. X, § 3; WYo. CoNsT. art. VII, § 1. See
generally Ratner, supra note 66, at 814.
125 Ratner, supra note 66, at 847:
Some state courts apply the federal 'explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution'
test for determining what rights are fundamental under the respective state's constitution.
When state courts apply this test to education, however, they usually reach a result opposite
from the federal courts. The reason for the difference is simple: although the federal
constitution does not explicitly protect education, virtually all state constitutions do. Under this
test, education is a fundamental right under state equal protection clauses. (footnotes omitted).
'26 1& at 814.
127 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
'2' 255 S.E.2d at 877.
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do... so economically."1 29 Pauley is, perhaps, the most far reaching example of a court
recognizing the fundamentality of education, requiring the state to ensure "the development
in every child to his or her capacity."'"
In a similar interpretation of its constitutional provision, the Washington Supreme
Court held that "the effective teaching and opportunities for learning.., essential skills
make up the minimum of education that is constitutionally required."'3' Like the Pauley
court, the Washington court demanded not only educational inputs, such as facilities and
teachers, but also required a level of education that would enable students to participate
adequately in the political system, hold jobs, think, and debate ideas.
In Abbott v. Burke,133 a New Jersey Supreme Court case decided on equal
protection grounds, the court held that the public school funding schemes enacted by the
legislature violated the state constitution's provision of a "thorough and efficient
education. ' 134 Although the court did not construe New Jersey's constitution as broadly
as the Pauley and Seattle courts, the court did emphasize that the funding scheme resulted
in an inadequate education of poor, urban children in contrast with wealthier, suburban
children 3s The court stated that, "these students in poorer urban districts have not been
able to participate fully as citizens and workers in our society."'" Although the court did
not deem education to be fundamental, it recognized that the glaring inadequacy of poor
urban students' education had dramatic implications for "their future and the state's
future.'37
Legislation on the state level mirrors that of the federal government regarding access
to education for all groups.38 States have endeavored to guarantee access for the
handicapped, the blind, the deaf, and non-English speaking adults. As it does on the federal
129 a
'3o Pauley, 162 W. Va. at -, 255 S.E.2d at 877. See generally Ratner, supra note 66, at 819.
131 Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (1978) (en banc) (emphasis
in original).
132 Id. at 518, 585 P.2d at 95.
133 119 NJ. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
134 Id. at 384, 575 A.2d 408.
135 Id. 119 NJ. at 385, 575 A.2d at 408 (1990). School finance cases offer an ancillary topic of controversy.
See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.
3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977), affg,
31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Hartford County Superior Court, 1974); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 NJ. 473, 303
A.2d 273 (1973), cert. denied sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Seattle School Dist. v. State
of Washington, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978) (en banc); Washakie Cty. School Dist. No. I v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310 (1980), reh'g denied, 606 P.2d 340 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). The principle can be
extracted, however, that when the state has guaranteed an education via its constitution, the right is substantial,
if not fundamental. Any difference of treatment, including funding schemes, of different groups of individuals
is then subject to strict scrutiny review and will most likely fail. T. VAN GEEL, supra note 105, at 290.
'36 Abbott v. Burke, 119 NJ. 287, 384, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (1990).
137 I
138 See, e.g., Quality Education Act, Pub. L. 1990, ch. 52, 1990 NJ. Laws 52, 1990 NJ. S.N. 2721 (enacted
in response to the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Abbott v. Burke, 119 NJ. 287, 545 A.2d 359 (1990)).
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level, the commitment to equal education demonstrates that education is a deep-rooted
function of our state governments. Although most states provide for education, state
legislatures and local schools boards do not, in practice, provide education equally when
they employ tracking systems.' This results in an inadequate and often tragic education
for poor and minority students.' Establishment of a federal standard of fundamentality
for education would remove discretion from states and localities, where provincial interests
and prejudice may guide decision-making regarding education. 41  Although the process
may be arduous, such a justification is insufficient to delay a right as significant as education,
as was expressed by Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education.
CONCLUSION
Those who are opposed to tracking because of its discriminatory and detrimental
effects are not without alternative educational strategies. Although most schools do still
track, increased awareness of tracking's consequences has generated programs which
abandon ability grouping.'42 Advocates of a non-tracking systems believe that in order to
facilitate teaching, heterogeneous groups can be broken down into smaller, mixed-ability
groups, using cooperative learning techniques. 43 Many of these techniques rely on
students to assist each other and work together to achieve a common objective. Cooperative
learning avoids the gaps caused by tracking.
Research has shown that cooperative learning is effective in increasing students'
academic achievement.' Improvement in students' intergroup relations has also been
found to improve with the use of cooperative learning. In a typical tracked school, students
spend most of their time with others within their track. Due to the concentration of
minorities in low tracks, students spend their time with students of their own race or
ethnicity. In a cooperative learning setting which offers exposure to other groups, students
139 J. OAKES, supra note 1, at 174.
140 Id. at 197, 205; Hearings, supra note 17.
'41 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 302, 575 A.2d at 366.
142 See, e.g., Ribadeneira, School Success Formula Sought, Boston Globe, Jan. 27, 1991, (Metro/Region),
at 25; Nealson, supra note 2, at 1 (citing a number of alternative plans: in September 1990, the Hull High School
abandoned tracking for the freshman class, except for math; over the next few years "the rigid tracking system
will be abolished in the upper high school grades as well." The Plymouth-Carver school district has been reduced
from four levels to just one, with more emphasis on cooperative learning. Brockton High School also utilized
cooperative learning techniques).
,43 The term cooperative learning refers to instructional methods in which students of all levels of
performance work together in small groups toward a common goal. 'The essehtial feature of cooperative learning
is that the success of one student helps other students to be successful." R. SLAVIN, COOPERATIvE LEARNING:
STUDENT TEAMS 5 (National Education Association) (1982) (providing an excellent analysis of and guide to
cooperative learning).
144 R. SLAViN, id. at 219, at 18-19.
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interact positively and express greater liking for their classmates. 45
Advocacy of intergroup cooperation has been prevalent since the days of Brown v.
Board of Education. Social science studies relied on in the Brown decision strongly
emphasized that "positive intergroup relations would arise from school desegregation if and
only if students were involved in cooperative, equal-status interaction sanctioned by the
school."'146
The discriminatory and detrimental effects of tracking are no longer acceptable to
many parents and educators. Although traditional disparate impact challenges are unlikely
to succeed due to the current Court's conservative posture, other legal strategies are
available. If education were established as a fundamental right, strict scrutiny would be
applied to the discriminatory practice of tracking. The burden of persuasion would be on
the school or state to prove that the separation of students and differential treatment of the
various groups of students was necessary to achieve a compelling governmental objective.
Education of our nation's children is most easily a compelling interest; however, the practice
of classification and placement of students according to perceived ability is not necessary.
Viable teaching alternatives are available to schools to accomplish educational objectives,
many of them more successful with regard to social development and academic achievement.
Establishment of a constitutional standard would eradicate tracking altogether and is
therefore the ideal solution, the trend of conservativism in the Court indicates that such a
solution is still in the distance. The use of other legal strategies, such as state-based
constitutional claims or legislative challenges may be a more practical, step-by-step method
of eliminating the use of tracking.
Alternative legal strategies offer a number of supported propositions: tracking
violates federal and state legislation ensuring equal educational opportunity; it violates the
mandate of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education; it violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution; and it violates the
original intent of the framers of the Constitution who believed education to be necessary
to a successful democracy. By tracking children we deny to them their fundamental right:
education that is equitable, rich, and attainable.
145 Id. at 23.
146 R. Slavin, supra note 143, at 23. See also SLAVIN, Cooperative Learning and Desegregation, in EFFECIIVE
DESEGREGATED SCHOOLS (1981).
TRA4CKING
